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A Survey on Cyber Security for Smart Grid
Communications
Ye Yan, Yi Qian, Hamid Sharif and David Tipper
Abstract—A smart grid is a new form of electricity network
with high fidelity power-flow control, self-healing, and energy
reliability and energy security using digital communications and
control technology. To upgrade an existing power grid into a
smart grid, it requires significant dependence on intelligent and
secure communication infrastructures. It requires security frame-
works for distributed communications, pervasive computing and
sensing technologies in smart grid. However, as many of the
communication technologies currently recommended to use by
a smart grid is vulnerable in cyber security, it could lead to
unreliable system operations, causing unnecessary expenditure,
even consequential disaster to both utilities and consumers. In
this paper, we summarize the cyber security requirements and
the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and
survey the current solutions on cyber security for smart grid
communications.
Index Terms—Smart grid communication, cyber security, vul-
nerability, reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
POWER industry is integrating the electrical distributionsystem with communication networks to form a two-
directional power and information flow infrastructure, which is
called a smart grid [1]. The integration not only moves power
automation systems from outdated, proprietary technology to
the advanced communication technologies, but also changes
the closed power control systems to the public data net-
works [2]. By adding significant new functionality, distributed
intelligence, and state-of-the-art communication capabilities
to the power grid, the smart grid infrastructure can be more
efficient, more resilient, and more affordable to manage and
operate [3], [4].
However, it brings not only great performance benefit to the
power industry, but also tremendous risks as well as arduous
challenges in protecting the smart grid systems from cyber
security threats [5]. Considering the vast scale of a smart
grid, it is reasonable to expect that the cumulative vulnerability
of the smart grid communication system might also be vast.
Virtually all parties agree that the consequences of a smart
grid cyber security breach can be enormous. New functions
such as demand response introduce significant new cyber
attack vectors such as a malware that initiates a massive
coordinated and instantaneous drop in demand, potentially
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Fig. 1. A Smart Grid Communication System [7]
causing substantial damage to distribution, transmission, and
even generation facilities [6].
A typical smart grid communication system, as illustrated
in Fig. 1, is a horizontal integration of one or more regional
control centers, with each center supervising the operation
of multiple power plants and substations. A smart grid
communication system has a layered structure and performs
data collection and control of electricity delivery. A regional
control center typically support metering system, operation
data management, power market operations, power system
operation and data acquisition control. Substations contain
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), circuit breaker. Human Ma-
chine Interfaces (HMIs), communication devices (switches,
hubs, and routers), log servers, data concentrators, and a
protocol gateway. Intelligent Electronic Device (IEDs) are
field devices, including an array of instrument transducers, tap
changers, circuit re-closers, phase measuring units (PMUs),
and protection relays [7].
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The legacy cyber security techniques for enterprise net-
works can hardly fit well for the requirements of a smart
grid communication system to operate securely in the public
data communication networks such as internet. Compared with
regular enterprise network systems, smart grid communica-
tion systems have different goals, objectives and assumptions
concerning what need to be protected in cyber security. It
is important to guarantee the real time performance and
continuous operation features in a smart grid communication
system. Those applications are not originally designed for
the general enterprise network environment. Therefore, it is
necessary to embrace the existing security solutions where
they fit, such as communication networks within a control
center and/or a substation, and develop unique solutions to fill
the gaps where traditional enterprise network cyber security
solutions do not work or apply [8].
Updating a system as complex as the smart grid commu-
nication infrastructure has the potential of introducing new
security vulnerabilities into the system. In [9] the author
presented a review of the work related to smart grid cyber
security. The work reviewed is separated into five categories
that make up different components of the smart grid: Process
Control System (PCS) Security, Smart Meter Security, Power
System State Estimation Security, Smart Grid Communication
Protocol Security, and Smart Grid Simulation for Security
Analysis. A smart grid is a large complex system, and it still
requires a lot of cyber security design work.
In this paper we present a summary of vulnerabilities and
potential cyber attacks on smart grid communication systems,
and the major challenges of cyber security in smart grid
communication systems. It also surveys the existing solutions
for cyber security in smart grid communications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the background of smart grid communication security is de-
scribed. Section III discusses the cyber security requirements
for smart grid systems. Challenges and current solutions are
discussed in Section IV and V respectively. Finally, Section
VI draws the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A smart grid communication system is comprised of several
subsystems. It is eventually a network of networks. SCADA
is not only a controlling system but also a communication
network in smart grid. The communication networks in smart
grid systems could include dedicated or overlayed land mobile
radios (LMR), cellular, microwaves, fiber optics, wirelines
such as power line communications (PLC), RS-232/RS-485
serial links, wireless local area networks (WLANs) or a versa-
tile data network combining these media [10]. In this section,
we briefly discuss the background of a smart grid system in
several aspects: SCADA system, communication networks and
deployments of secure smart grid communications.
A. SCADA
Core to the monitoring and control of a substation is the
SCADA system. It is utilized for Distribution Automation
(DA) and computerized remote control of Medium Voltage
(MV) substations and power grids, and it helps electric utilities
to achieve higher reliability of supply and reduce operating
and maintenance costs. In the past, Sectionalizer Switchgears,
Ring Main Units, Reclosers and Capacitor Banks were de-
signed for local operations with limited remote control. Today,
using SCADA over reliable wireless communication links,
RTUs provide powerful integrated solutions when upgrad-
ing remotely installed electric equipment. In a Distribution
Management System (DMS), RTUs seamlessly interface via
SCADA with a wide range of high performance control
centers supplied by leading vendors worldwide. Connection to
these Enterprise Management Systems (EMS) and DA/DMS
control centers is typically provided via a high performance
IP Gateway or a similar node [11].
B. Communication Networks
The operational and commercial demands of electric utili-
ties require a high-performance data communication network
that supports both existing functionalities and future opera-
tional requirements. Such a communication network consti-
tutes the core of the electric system automation applications.
The design of a cost-effective and reliable network architecture
is crucial. In [12], the opportunities and challenges of a
hybrid network architecture are discussed for electric system
automation. Internet based Virtual Private Networks (VPNs),
power line communications, satellite communications and
wireless communications (wireless sensor networks, WiMAX
and wireless mesh networks) are discussed. It provides a brief
survey on the hybrid network architecture that can support the
heterogeneous electric system automation application require-
ments. A smart grid communication network as a structured
framework for electric utilities is planned to utilize new
communication technologies for automation, and hence, to
make the decision-making process more effective and direct.
Different scale and structure of the smart grid systems adopt
different communication networking solutions. Advanced me-
tering infrastructure (AMI) solutions can be meshed or point-
to-point, with short local coverage or long range communi-
cations [13], [14]. Options for backhaul solutions might be
fiber, wireless broadband, or broadband over power-line. The
possible solutions include WiMax, WLAN, WSN, cellular and
LMR, depending on the reliability, throughput, and coverage
desired by the utility. The wireless communication solutions
can be either licensed or unlicensed, again depending on the
needs of the utility. For the highest reliability, licensed should
be chosen. Each of the above options has their advantages
and disadvantages, but what is consistently true of any and
all of the solutions is the need to have a scalable security
solution [15].
C. Deployments
Smart grid deployments must meet stringent security re-
quirements. Strong authentication will be required for all
users and devices which may affect the operation of the
grid. With the large number of users and devices affected,
scalable key and trust management systems, customized to
the specific needs of the Energy Service Provider, will be
essential. What has been learned from years of deploying and
operating large secure network communication systems is that
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the effort required to provision symmetric keys into thousands
of devices can be too expensive or insecure. The development
of key and trust management systems for large networks is
required; these systems can be leveraged from other indus-
tries, such as land mobile radio systems and Association of
Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) radio sys-
tems. Several APCO deployed systems provide state-wide
wireless coverage, with tens of thousands of secure devices.
Trust management systems, based on public key infrastructure
(PKI) technology, could be customized specifically for smart
grid operators, easing the burden of providing security which
adheres to the standards and guidelines that are known to be
secure [16]. Within three years there are expected to be over
1000 PMUs installed. There will be many more installed in
distribution networks to help accommodate intermittent power
from rooftop solar and electric vehicles. Additionally, PMUs
will begin appearing at the terminals of generation equipment,
transformers, and large motors. They will be used in large
commercial and residential facilities. One of the key reasons
for redundancy in PMU systems in smart grid is to support
the requirements to be able to make security patches to the
software without lost data. These software patches must be
made with no loss of data. The energy company experience
during the Hurricane Gustav power island event is a clear
example of the value of PMUs for real time operations of the
grid [17].
III. REQUIREMENTS
The reliability of a smart grid depends on the reliability
of the control and communication systems. In the develop-
ment of smart grids, communication systems are becoming
more and more sophisticated, allowing for better control and
higher reliability. Smart grid will require higher degrees of
network connectivity to support the new features. Meanwhile,
the higher degree of connectivity should have corresponding
sophisticated security protocols to deal with the cyber secu-
rity vulnerabilities and breaches. Table I lists some security
protocols adopted by different layers in communication net-
works with the specific security requirements, more details
are summarized in [18]. In this section, we discuss the high
level security requirements in general and the major secu-
rity requirements and vulnerabilities in privacy, availability,
integrity, authentication, authorization, auditability, nonrepudi-
ability, third-party protection, and trust components for smart
grid communications.
A. High Level Security Requirements
According to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),
one of the biggest challenges facing the smart grid deployment
is related to cyber security of the systems [19]. According to
the EPRI Report, cyber security is a critical issue due to the
increasing potential of cyber attacks and incidents against this
critical sector as it becomes more and more interconnected.
Cyber security must address not only deliberate attacks, such
as from disgruntled employees, industrial espionage, or ter-
rorists, but inadvertent compromises of the information in-
frastructure due to user errors, equipment failures, and natural
disasters. Vulnerabilities might allow an attacker to penetrate
a network, gain access to control software, and alter load
conditions to destabilize the grid in unpredictable ways. The
high level requirements for smart grid communication security
are conducted in various organizations and the corresponding
standards in details.
There are many organizations working on the development
of smart grid security requirements including North American
Electrical Reliability Corporation-Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection (NERC-CIP [20]), International Society of Automation
(ISA [21]), IEEE 1402 [22], National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP [23]), and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), which has a number of smart grid cyber
security programs on proceeding.
One prominent source of requirements is the Smart Grid
Interoperability Panel (SGiP) Cyber Security Working Group,
previously the NIST Cyber Security Coordination Task Group
(CSCTG) [24]. The NIST CSCTG was established to ensure
consistency in the cyber security requirements across all the
smart grid domains and components. The latest draft document
from the Cyber Security Working Group, NIST Interagency
Report (NIST-IR7628) [25], entitled Smart Grid Cyber Se-
curity Strategy and Requirements, continues to evolve at the
time of this writing. NIST and the DoE GridWise Architec-
ture Council (GWAC) [26] have established Domain Expert
Working Groups (DEWGs): Home-to-Grid (H2G), Building-
to-Grid (B2G), Industrial-to-Grid (I2G), Transmission and
Distribution (T&D) and Business and Policy (B&P).
Working with standards bodies, such as NIST and others,
will be extremely important to ensure a highly secure, scalable,
consistently deployed smart grid system, as these standards
bodies will drive the security requirements of the system [27].
One thing is consistent among the various standards bodies,
the security of the grid will strongly depend on authentication,
authorization, and privacy technologies. Privacy technologies
are well matured. Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) approved Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [28]
and Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) [29] solutions,
offering strong security and high performance, are readily
available. The specific privacy solution required will depend
on the type of communication resource being protected. As
a specific example, NIST has determined that 3DES solution
will likely become insecure by the year 2030. Considering that
utility components are expected to have long lifetimes, AES
would be the preferred solution for new components. However,
it is reasonable to expect that under certain circumstances
where legacy functionality must be supported and the risk of
compromise is acceptable, 3DES could be used.
Wireless links will be secured with technologies from
well-known standards such as IEEE 802.11i [30] and IEEE
802.16e [31]. Different wireless protocols have varying de-
grees of security mechanisms. Wired links will be secured with
firewalls, virtual private networks (VPNs) and IPSec technolo-
gies. Higher layer security mechanisms such as Secure Shell
(SSH) and SSL/TLS should also be used [32].
System architects and designers often identify the need for
and specify the use of secure protocols, such as SSH and
IPSec, but then skip the implementation details associated
with establishing security associations between end points
of communications. Such an approach is likely to result
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TABLE I
LAYERED SECURITY PROTOCOLS
Layer Security Protocol Application Confidentiality Integrity Authentication
Application











Network IPSec Host-to-Host Yes Yes Host
Link
CHAP/PAP Point-to-Point No No Client
WEP/WAP/802.1X Wireless Access Yes Yes Device
in a smart grid communication system where the necessary
procedures for secure key management can quickly become
extremely huge and complicated an operational nightmare.
This is due to the fact that, when system architects do not
develop an integrated and comprehensive key management
scheme, customers may be provided with few key management
options, and often resort to manually pre-configuring symmet-
ric keys. This approach is simple for the system designers, but
it can be very expensive for the system owners/operators.
B. Privacy
Privacy issues have to be covered with the derived customer
consumption data as they are created in metering devices.
Consumption data contains detailed information that can be
used to gain insights on a customer’s behavior.
Smart grid communications have unintended consequences
for customer privacy. Electricity usage information stored
at the smart meter and distributed thereafter acts as an
information-rich side channel, exposing customers’ habits and
behaviors. Certain activities, such as watching television, have
detectable power consumption signatures. History has shown
that where financial or political incentives align, the techniques
for mining behavioral data will evolve quickly to match the
desires of those who would exploit that information [33].
Utility companies are not the only sources of potential
privacy abuse. The recently announced Google PowerMeter
service [34], for instance, receives real-time usage statistics
from installed smart meters. Customers subscribing to the
service receive a customized web page that visualizes local
usage. Although Google has yet to announce the final privacy
policy for this service, early versions leave the door open to the
company using this information for commercial purposes, such
as marketing individual or aggregate usage statistics to third
parties. Although services such as Google PowerMeter are
optional, the customers have less control over the use of power
information delivered to utility companies. Existing privacy
laws in the US are in general a patchwork of regulations
and guidelines. It is unclear how these or any laws apply to
customer energy usage yet.
C. Availability
Availability refers to ensuring that unauthorized persons or
systems cannot deny access or use to authorized users. For
smart grid systems, this refers to all the IT elements of the
plant, like control systems, safety systems, operator work-
stations, engineering workstations, manufacturing execution
systems, as well as the communication systems between these
elements and to the outside world.
Malicious attacks targeting availability can be considered
as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which attempt to delay,
block or even corrupt information transmission in order to
make network resources unavailable to communicating nodes
that need information exchange in the smart grid. Since it is
widely expected that at least, if not all, part of the smart grid
will use IP-based protocols (e.g., IEC 61580 [35] has already
adopted TCP/IP as a part of its protocol stacks) and TCP/IP is
vulnerable to DoS attacks. DoS attacks against TCP/IP have
been well studied in the literature regarding attacking types,
prevention and response [36]–[38].
However, a major difference between a smart grid commu-
nication network and the Internet is that the smart grid is more
concerned with the message delay than the data throughput
due to the timing constraint of messages transmitted over the
power networks. Indeed, network traffic in smart grid commu-
nication networks is in general time-critical. For instance, the
delay constraint of generic object oriented substation events
(GOOSE) messages is 4 ms in IEC 61850.
Intruders only need to connect to communication channels
rather than authenticated networks in the smart grid, it is very
easy for them to launch DoS attacks against the smart grid
communication networks, especially for the wireless-based
communication networks that are susceptible to jamming
attacks [39]–[41]. Hence, it is of critical importance to evaluate
the impact of DoS attacks on the smart grid and to design
effective countermeasures to such attacks.
D. Integrity
Integrity refers to preventing undetected modification of
information by unauthorized persons or systems. For smart
grid communication systems, this applies to information such
as product recipes, sensor values, or control commands. This
objective includes defense against information modification
via message injection, message replay, and message delay on
the network. Violation of integrity may cause safety issues,
that is, equipment or people may be harmed.
Different from attacks targeting availability, attacks target-
ing data integrity can be regarded as less brute-force yet more
sophisticated attacks. The target of the integrity attacks is
either customer’s information (e.g., pricing information and
customer account balance) or network operation information
(e.g., voltage readings, device running status). In other words,
such attacks attempt to deliberately modify the original infor-
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mation in the smart grid communication system in order to
corrupt critical data exchange in the smart grid.
The risk of attacks targeting data integrity in the power
networks is indeed real. A notable example is the recent
work [42], which proposed a new type of attacks, called false
data injection attacks, against the state estimation in the power
grid. It assumed that an attacker has already compromised one
or several meters and pointed out that the attacker can take
advantage of the configuration of a power system to launch
attacks by injecting false data to the monitoring center, which
can legitimately pass the data integrity check used in current
power systems.
E. Authentication
Authentication is concerned with determination of the true
identity of a communication system participator and mapping
of this identity to a system-internal principal (e.g., valid
user account) by which this user is known to the system.
Most other security objectives, most notably authorization,
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate users based on
authentication.
F. Authorization
Authorization, also known as access control, is concerned
with preventing access to the system by persons or systems
without permission to do so. In the wider sense, authorization
refers to the mechanism that distinguishes between legitimate
and illegitimate users for all other security objectives, e.g.,
confidentiality, integrity, etc. In the narrower sense of access
control, it refers to restricting the ability to issue commands to
the plant control system. Violation of authorization may cause
safety issues.
G. Auditability
Auditability is concerned with being able to reconstruct
the complete history of the system behavior from historical
records of all (relevant) actions executed on it. This security
objective is mostly relevant to discover and find reasons for
malfunctions in the system after the fact, and to establish the
scope of the malfunction or the consequences of a security
incident. Note that auditability without authentication may
serve diagnostic purposes, but does not provide accountability.
H. Nonrepudiability
Nonrepudiability refers to being able to provide irrefutable
proof to a third party of who initiated a certain action in the
system, even if this actor is not cooperating. This security
objective is relevant to establish accountability and liability.
In the context of smart grid systems, this is most important
regarding to regulatory requirements, violation of this security
requirement has typically legal/commercial consequences.
I. Third-party Protection
Third-party protection refers to averting damage done to
third parties via the communication systems, that is, damage
that does not involve safety hazards of the controlled plant
itself. The successfully attacked and subverted automation
system could be used for various attacks on the communi-
cation systems or data or users of external third parties, e.g.,
via Distributed DoS (DDoS) or worm attacks. Consequences
could reach from a damaged reputation of a smart grid system
owner up to legal liability for the damages of the third
party. The risk to third parties through possible safety-relevant
failures of the plant arising out of attacks against the plant
automation system is covered by other security objectives,
most notably authorization/access control.
J. Trust
The new designs of future smart grid communication sys-
tems form a multi-layered architecture. The growth of smart
grid systems resulted in a plentifulness of power system
related software applications, developed in many different
programming languages and platforms. Extending old appli-
cations or developing new ones usually involves integrating
legacy systems. Therefore approaching the security of future
smart grid communication networks cannot be done with a
complete new start.
In parallel to the development of smart grid communication
systems, the complete and monolithic cyber security infras-
tructure is not a viable option. Instead, multi-layer architec-
ture, advanced control methodologies and dependable software
infrastructure as well as device protection mechanisms and
hardware monitoring anchors have to be specified at the same
time. Advanced control approaches have to include predictive
and self-adaptive intelligence at higher level and cross-layer
mapping to the different technical layers. The dependable
software infrastructures have to be designed to identify and
isolate higher-layer independent applications as well as to
secure cross-layer communications. With such architecture, it
should have the flexibility of incorporating parts of existing
infrastructure with the frontiers and interfaces to adjacent
systems. Furthermore, the architecture needs the flexibility
to interchange or update the part of the system in a secure
way at a later stage due to new laws and regulations or new
developments in the energy market [43].
IV. CHALLENGES
Smart grid is a conglomeration of different legacy systems
paired with new technologies and architectural approaches,
based on different standards and regulations that all need to
be amalgamated into a communication network to support the
challenges of the future electricity network. To support this
objective, the cyber security architecture for smart grid com-
munications are being presented on the basis of cyber security
and architecture requirements, dependency on legacy installa-
tions, and the regulations and industry standards. This section
provides an overview of classifying functions and systems
in a future smart grid communication network. Furthermore,
it introduces methods for defining security controls and thus
enabling the further development of a compliance process with
regard to trusted connectivity in smart grid communications.
The major challenges in building and operating a secure
smart grid communication system include internetworking,
security policy and operations, security services, efficiency and
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scalability, and the differences between enterprise network and
smart grid network security.
A. Internetworking
The interconnected smart grid communication systems are
riddled with vulnerabilities that vary across the networks due
to the lack of built-in security in many applications and
devices. This should not be the model for a network as
important as the smart grid. Layers of cyber security defense
of smart grid should be built into the solution to minimize
the threats from interruption, interception, modification, and
fabrication.
Keeping the network private, i.e. where all transport facili-
ties are wholly owned by a utility, would greatly minimize
the threats from intruders, as there would be no potential
for access from intruders over the Internet. But having a
completely separate network is not feasible in today’s highly
connected world. It makes good business sense to reuse
communication facilities, such as the Internet. A minimally
secured smart grid connected with Internet as commonly found
with commercial networks, opens the grid to threats from
multiple types of attacks. These include cyber attacks from
hostile groups looking to cause an interruption to the power
supply [33], [44].
One of these cyber attacks is worm infestations which have
proven to negatively impact critical network infrastructures.
Such threats have largely been the result of leaving a network
vulnerable to threats from the Internet. For example, there
have been DoS attacks on a single network that disrupted all
directory name servers, thus prohibiting users from connecting
to any of the resources. It demonstrates the fragility of an
interconnected smart grid communication infrastructure [45].
All connections to the Internet from a smart grid network
need to be highly secure. Intrusion detection is needed not
only at the points where a smart grid network connects to the
Internet, but also critical points within the network as well as
vulnerable wireless interfaces [46].
The components, systems, networks, and architecture are all
important to the security design and reliability of the smart
grid communication solutions. But its inevitable that an inci-
dent will occur at some point and one must be prepared with
the proper incident response plan. This can vary between com-
mercial providers and private utility networks. A private utility
network is likely to provide better consistency of the incident
response plan in the event of a security incident, assuming
the private network is built upon a standardized framework of
hardware and software. The speed of the response decreases
exponentially as the number of parties involved increases.
Conversely, a private network would ideally depend on fewer
parties, therefore a more efficient incident response process
would provide for more rapid response and resolution. The
rapidity of the response is critical during situations that involve
a blackout [47].
Criticalness of a device or a system also determines how
prone it will be to attacks. History has shown that private
networks by their inherent nature are less prone to attacks. As
a result, it is recommended as the best approach in situations
where security is paramount [48].
B. Security Policy and Operations
The reliability of a smart grid depends on the proper
operations of many components and the proper connectivity
between them [49]. To disrupt a smart grid system, an attacker
might attempt to gain electronic access to a component and
configure it to impersonate as another component and/or report
a false condition or alarm. One of the simplest types of attacks
that an adversary might attempt is the DoS attack, where the
adversary prevents authorized devices from communicating by
consuming excessive resources on one device. For example,
it is a well-known issue that if a node, such as a server or an
access control device, uses an authentication protocol which
is prior to authentication and authorization, then the node may
be subject to DoS attacks. Smart grid protocol designers must
ensure that proper care and attention is given to this threat
during protocol development.
Many organizations will be involved in the operations of
a smart grid. As more distributed intelligence entities are
added to the smart grid communication network, it will be
essential that those entities (people or devices) can authenticate
and determine the authorization status of other entities from
a remote organization. This issue is commonly referred to
as federated identity management. There are many possible
technical solutions to this issue based on different security
policies, such as those offered by Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) [50], Web Services Trust (WS-Trust) [51],
and PKI [52]. Not only will vendors need to offer consis-
tent technical solutions, but organizations will further need
consistent security policies. Great care must be taken by
organizations to ensure their security policies and practices are
not in conflict with those of other organizations with which
they will need interoperability. At least a minimum set of
operational security policies for the organizations operating
a smart grid is formally adopted and documented in industry
standards [53].
C. Security Services
Managing and maintaining a secure smart grid will be
as equally vital as developing, deploying and integrating a
secure smart grid solution. Security services will help network
operators to identify, control and manage security risks in
smart grid communications.
According to EPRI, every aspect of a smart grid must
be secure [19]. Cyber security technologies are not enough
to achieve secure operations without policies, on-going risk
assessment, and training. The development of these human
focused procedures takes time and needs to take time to ensure
that they are done correctly.
A smart grid requires access to cost-effective, high-
performance security services, including expertise in mobility,
security, and system integration. These security services can be
tailored per utility to best fit their needs and help them achieve
their organizational objectives. Fig. 2 illustrates a typical
set of security services in smart grid communications [54].
It describes a framework that operationalizes cyber security
across the people, process, policy and technology foundations
of each organization.
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Fig. 2. Smart Grid Security Services [54]
D. Efficiency and Scalability
Ensuring system availability is a high priority in critical
systems like the smart grid which requires that several key
issues be addressed. First, the system must be efficient in
its use of computation and communication resources so that
resources do not get overwhelmed and all requests can be
handled. Second, the system must have good error manage-
ment built in to ensure proper handling of failures (e.g.,
those resulting from bad messages). Furthermore, the error
management functions must be fail-safe in nature so they do
not lead to resource exhaustion even in the face of adversarial
action. Third, the system must have adequate redundancy built
into it so that, if sub-systems fail or are compromised, then
the entire system does not collapse. Fourth, the system should
support auxiliary security functions that may be deployed in
the smart grid communication system to detect to and respond
to cyber attacks [49].
Since many existing cyber security scheme such as key
management schemes are not suitable for deployment in smart
grid, in [55] the authors proposed a novel key management
scheme which combines symmetric key technique and elliptic
curve public key technique. The symmetric key scheme is
based on the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol. The
known threats including the man-in-the-middle attack and the
replay attack can be effectively eliminated under the proposed
scheme. The advantages of the key management scheme for
smart grid communication include strong security, scalability,
fault-tolerance and efficiency.
E. Differences between Enterprise Network and Smart Grid
Network Security
During the last decade, the IT industry has witnessed
the development of many cyber security solutions to protect
enterprise networks and to reduce the vulnerabilities to cyber
attacks. From firewalls to intrusion detection systems (IDS)
and Virtual Private Networks (VPN), these solutions have been
quite effective in securing the IT infrastructure at business
and office automation levels. However, the enterprise network
based cyber security solutions come short of providing the
same level of security at the control and automation levels.
There are three major differences between enterprise network
and smart grid network security.
1) Different Security Objectives: In enterprise networks,
the main security objective is to protect data. The following
major concerns exist: 1) data integrity; 2) data confidentiality;
and 3) data availability. Preserving data integrity refers to
protecting data against modification by unauthorized persons
or entities. Data confidentiality refers to the prevention of data
access by unauthorized persons or entities. Maintaining data
availability involves ensuring that no person or entity could
deny access to those authorized users and systems. In smart
grid, the first priority is always human safety. The second
priority is to ensure the system reliability. For instance, a cyber
attack could create a blackout (system outage), a brownout
(degraded power quality) or shift the power grid system from
its economically optimal running condition. The third priority
is the protection of equipment and power lines [53].
2) Different Security Architecture: In enterprise networks,
the data server resides at the center of the network and requires
more protection than the edge nodes, which are used as access
points by end users. In smart grid networks, EMS sits at
the center (in the control center) whereas RTU/PLCs sit at
the edge. Usually, only devices (such as re-closer, circuit
breaker), which are controlled directly by RTU/PLCs, can
do harm to human life, operation, or damage equipment and
power lines. EMS/SCADA and data log servers cannot do
any damage directly. Therefore, in smart grid communication
systems, edge nodes need the same level of protection as
central devices [56].
3) Different Technology Base: In enterprise networks, Win-
dows, Unix and Linux are widely used as operating systems,
whereas Ethernet is used to connect all devices with IP-
based protocols. Therefore, common security solutions are
designed based on these common architectures. However, in
current smart grid communication systems, besides the com-
mon operating systems above, many utilities use proprietary
operating systems and networks facilities, and many different
communication protocols (IEC61850, DNP 3.0, ICCP, etc.)
are in use rather than ordinary TCP/IP suits. Thus, it is
very difficult to develop common host-based or network-based
security solutions for smart grid applications [57].
V. CURRENT SOLUTIONS
In this section, we survey several existing solutions on cyber
security for smart grid communications. We focus on the tech-
nologies being deployed, the key smart grid communication
applications being implemented and the outlines of power
industry trials that have recently been announced in privacy,
integrity, authentication and trusted computing.
A. Privacy
Privacy of smart grid communication systems is important
to the eventual acceptance by the public. Smart grid commu-
nications must assure that the communication data preserves
privacy anywhere at anytime.
In [44], the authors proposed a method for compressed me-
ter reading for smart metering in smart grid communications.
The distinguishing feature of the compressed meter reading is
that the active smart meters are allowed to transmit simulta-
neously and the access point (AP) is able to distinguish the
reports from different smart meters. The simultaneous access
results in uniform delays, in contrast to the possible large delay
in carrier sensing multiple access (CSMA) technique. The
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random sequence used in the compressed sensing enhances
the privacy of the meter reading.
In [58], the authors described a method for securely
anonymizing frequent (for example, every few minutes) elec-
trical metering data sent by a smart meter. Although such
frequent metering data may be required by a utility or
electrical energy distribution network for operational reasons,
the data may not necessarily be attributable to a specific
smart meter or consumer. However, it needs to be securely
attributable to a specific location (e.g. a group of houses or
apartments) within the electricity distribution network. The
proposed method provides a 3rd party escrow mechanism for
authenticated anonymous meter readings which are difficult
to associate with a particular smart meter or customer. This
method does not preclude the provision of attributable meter-
ing data that is required for other purposes such as billing,
account management or marketing research purposes.
In [59], the authors presented a home electrical power
routing scheme that can be used to moderate the home’s load
signature in order to hide appliance usage information. A
power management model using a rechargeable battery with
a power mixing algorithm is proposed. Then, the protection
level is evaluated by proposing three different privacy metrics:
an information theoretic (relative entropy), a clustering classi-
fication, and a correlation/regression one. This paper sets the
ground for further research on the subject of optimizing home
energy management hiding load signatures.
In smart grid communication systems, any stored data
should be encrypted using storage keys shielded similar to
the mechanisms proposed in [60]–[62]. While a Storage Root
Key (SRK) can be used to develop a key chain by encrypting
individual storage keys whose private part will not be exposed
to the host system. The storage keys then may seal potentially
unlimited data on any medium [63].
B. Integrity
Several integrity policy models (e.g., Biba [64], LOMAC
[65], and Clark-Wilson [66]) have been developed to govern
integrity levels of a system. The Biba model ensures that
processes can not corrupt data in higher levels and are not
corrupted by data from lower level processes [64]. The
LOMAC model dynamically sets the integrity level of a
process to the minimum integrity level of data it interacts
with [65]. Similarly, the Clark-Wilson model allows a process
to discard or upgrade the integrity level of data thus allowing
it to interact with lower integrity level data [66]. In smart grid
communications, however, it might leave the policy decisions
to a user but focus on mechanisms to provide security services.
In the following, system integrity, process integrity, and data
integrity are discussed:
1) System integrity: System integrity is a binary property
that indicates whether the system has a trustworthy execu-
tion environment. Using trusted computing functionalities,
it performs binary attestation to verify the integrity of a
system and its enforcement capabilities. Particularly, all parties
in blind processing will challenge peers to ensure that the
remote system conforms to Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
specifications with (1) a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
providing root of trust, (2) a security kernel providing an
isolated execution environment for trusted processes whose
computations and memory are safe from tampering, (3) a cryp-
tographically protected storage for sensitive data decipherable
only by the dedicated process, and (4) shielded communication
channels with remote processes.
2) Process integrity: The integrity of a process essentially
depends on the genuineness of its code. It is important not only
to detect changes in software but also to ensure that newly de-
veloped code is trustworthy. A modified code may yield mali-
cious behavior that would compromise the data. We can ensure
the integrity of a process using fingerprints, i.e., cryptographic
digest or hash functions of its code. When communicating
with an ally or competitor process both parties will assure
the integrity of each other by comparing stored fingerprints
with reported Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) values
before transmitting any data. To enforce process integrity, it
applies software engineering techniques that enhance software
security, including safe software architecture and compilation
techniques for intrusion prevention [67], security specification
and management [68], software quality assurance throughout
software lifecycle, and security testing [69].
3) Data integrity: Verifying the genuineness of data de-
pends on whether the data is collected or generated. Collected
data is primitive data given to a process and its integrity is
application specific. Some techniques to ensure integrity of
collected data are semantic check (i.e., integration of logic
into the process to verify data semantics), certificate (i.e.,
signatures from trusted central authorities), and trusted path
(i.e., ensuring that the data come from an authenticated user
or sensing device) [70].
Generated data integrity depends on genuineness of the
process and collected data. Overall, data integrity requires
a chain of trust. Ensuring the integrity of generated data
requires ensuring the integrity of the generating process as
well as the integrity of input data to the process. Ensuring the
integrity of input data requires ensuring the genuineness of
the communicating process or the input device.
Integrity evaluation involves verifying the source, its in-
tegrity, and freshness of the measurements and requires knowl-
edge of fingerprints (i.e., SHA-1 hashes) of the code involved
in blind processing. Secure root processes of the TPM are
utilized to develop authenticators that ensure integrity of
processes using the Core Root of Trust for Measurement
(CRTM) [71]–[73]. Moreover, as CRTM performs integrity
measurement at load-time, run-time vulnerabilities will be
detected using run-time attestation [70] and verifiable code
execution [74].
Integrity measurement of a complete interactive system
is a challenging task, as thousands of measurements and
knowledge of their fingerprints may be required for various
software [75], [76]. In [77] the authors investigated the in-
tegrity of a known set of processes loaded in a deterministic
order and running in an isolated environment from the rest
of the processes. Using a security kernel, a system needs to
ensure integrity of the TPM, the BIOS, the security kernel and
a well-known set of processes providing blind processing.
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Fig. 3. Digital signature approach for authentication and integrity [81].
C. Authentication
Smart grid communications must be authenticated by
adding to the information flow transmission to verify whether
a communication entity is the one that is claimed and the
transmitted data has integrity [78]. The mechanisms that pro-
vide authentication usually also provide integrity, the ability
to verify that a message has arrived unaltered from its original
state. Authentication and integrity can help smart grid system
to protect against the most common cyber attacks, including
man-in-the-middle, forgery, impersonation, and message mod-
ification. Numerous tools exist for providing authentication
and integrity, including hashes and keyed hashes such as SHA-
1 or HMAC-SHA-1 and digital signatures such as RSA or
ECC signatures [79].
One of the sophisticated attacks that authentication proto-
cols must address is the replay attack, in which an adversary
captures messages and replays them to the devices later. A
message may have dramatically different effects depending
upon when it is received. For example, a message to increase
reactive power output by 10 MVAr is appropriate to deal with a
low voltage situation. However, if the same message is delayed
and resent during a time when the system is experiencing high
voltages, the result of the same message will be the opposite
of what was intended. There are two popular ways for helping
ensure that a message is fresh and not a replay. If the system
can support the notion of time and at least loose clock synchro-
nization, then timestamps can provide freshness. Therefore,
timestamps have their own constraint on synchronization [80].
Other options include the use of nonces (random numbers) and
sequence numbers. Nonces usually involve an extra message
exchange while sequence numbers, which identify the order of
individual TCP packets, need reliable communication channels
to ensure synchronization. Any authentication effort must
provide some way to ensure that a message is current and
not the rebroadcast of a previously sent communication.
In [81], the authors proposed an authentication and integrity
approach that used digital signatures and timestamps. Fig. 3 il-
lustrates this approach. Parties A and B reside within the same
communication realm. A transmits to B the message MComm
and a timestamp T in plaintext, along with the digital signature
of the message and timestamp combination, MComm|T . It
computes the digital signature by hashing MComm|T and
then encrypting it with its private key PRA. The recipient
B receives the plaintext message MComm and timestamp T,
along with the digital signature. It decrypts the signature
using A’s public key to unwrap the hash H(MComm|T )
 
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Fig. 4. HMAC approach for authentication and integrity [81].







), and compares H
′
with H . If they
match, then B knows that MComm|T and M ′Comm|T
′
are
identical. Therefore, B can conclude that the message must
have been sent by A, since A’s public key can faithfully
decrypt something encrypted by A’s private key only; and that
the combination of message and timestamp were not altered
in transit. To guard against replay, when B confirms that the
timestamp it received matches what A tried to send, it will
record the timestamp in its own log. If it receives another
message with the same timestamp later, it knows that the later
message must be a replay, and can discard that.
The digital signature approach might introduce more com-
putational overhead than is necessary. Since confidentiality
does not merit as much concern as authentication and integrity
for real-time control in smart grid, an approach that does
not require an encryption step, HMAC [82], might be more
appropriate. Fig. 4 shows A sends a message M to B at
time T using HMAC to provide authentication and integrity.
A and B share some secret, KAB . Along with M and T,
A computes and sends to B the HMAC of the combination
M |T . When this message arrives at B, B computes its own
HMAC of the combination M |T it received. If the HMAC B
computes matches the HMAC value received from A, then B
can conclude, assuming no other entities have knowledge of
the secret key KAB it shares with A, that A must have sent the
message and that no third party altered the combinationM |T
in transit. Therefore, B has authenticated the sender of the
message and verified the integrity of the contents. Verification
of message freshness works as that B will maintain a log of
received timestamps and reject later messages that have an
identical timestamp to one that appears in the log already.
The reduced computational expense of HMAC makes it the
preferred authentication and integrity approach for situations
where confidentiality is not a primary concern.
D. Trusted Computing
Considering the incredible size of the cyber security threat
and severe consequences from cyber attacks, the smart grid
cyber security protection must be extremely tight to the cyber
security requirements. Smart grid communication requires a
comprehensive security plan that encompasses virtually all
aspects of smart grid operations. One component of such
a plan includes trusted computing. Fig. 5 shows a basic
trusted computing model [83]. Such platforms and associated
mechanisms are used to ensure that malware is not introduced
into software processing devices. The main design goal is the
realization of a minimal and therefore manageable, stable and
evaluable security kernel for conventional hardware platforms,
servers, embedded systems, and mobile devices like PDAs and
smartphones. All requirements are fulfilled by extracting only
security-critical operations and data to the security kernel.
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Fig. 5. Trusted Computing model [83]
There are two categories of devices for which the mal-
ware protection problems should be considered: embedded
computer systems and general purpose computer systems.
Embedded systems are computer systems that are designed to
perform a specific task or set of tasks. They are intended to run
only software that is supplied by the manufacture. By contrast,
general purpose systems are intended to support third party
software purchased by the specific consumer who purchased
the system. A PC is an excellent example of a general purpose
system. A microwave oven, or cable television set-top box,
are examples of embedded systems. The problem of malware
protection should be considered separately for each category.
For embedded systems the problem of protecting the system
against the installation of malware can be solved with high
degrees of assurance. First and foremost the manufacturer
must implement secure software development processes. Many
standard models for such processes are defined [84]. Second,
if the device is intended to be field upgradable, the man-
ufacturer must provide a secure software upgrade solution.
The predominant method of doing this is to manufacture the
embedded system hardware with secure storage containing
keying material for a software validation. Typically the hard-
ware is configured with the public key of a secure signing
server operated by the manufacturer. With this key, the device
can validate any newly downloaded software prior to running
it. Such a proactive approach can provide higher levels of
assurance than can be obtained with a reactive approach such
as a virus checker.
For devices which are intended to run for long periods of
time (e.g., years) without booting, it is useful to have a method
of performing secure software validation on running code. It
is possible to have background tasks that can periodically
perform such functions without disrupting the operations of
the device. It is further possible to couple such background
validation steps with other operational aspects of the device,
such that if the device is found to be compromised, secure
hardware on the device (needed to bring up and maintain se-
curity associations with remote entities) will prevent the local
device from establishing and maintaining security associations
with the remote entities. In [85], the authors described some
methods to provide remote device attestation.
To make matters worse, the rapid adoption of cloud comput-
ing and sophisticated Internet based applications has resulted
in the widespread deployment of a number of mobile code
technologies. Mobile code is the code which is downloaded
and run on your PC, typically by your browser, without
the users’ knowledge. Examples of mobile code include Ac-
tiveX, Flash animation, Java, JavaScript, PDF, Postscript, and
Shockwave. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Control System Security Program recommends tight controls
on mobile code in critical control systems for the nation’s
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) [86].
To address this concern, the adoption of, and adherence
to, strict code signing standards by smart grid suppliers
and operators are proposed. Mechanisms for enforcing such
standards on general purpose computers, such as PCs, have
been put forth by the Trusted Computing Group and are
well documented [87]. Such standards should cover all critical
devices including field deployed units, such as RTU and IED,
network devices, such as routers, switches, and firewalls, and
control center equipment, such as servers and user consoles.
The standards should cover embedded systems, as well as
general purpose computers, their operating systems, drivers,
and applications, as well as all mobile codes. That is, no
mobile code should be allowed to run on a critical PC or
server that has not been signed by an authority that is able
to determine the trustworthiness of the code. Considering
that it is certain that hardware and software elements for
critical components of the grid will come from many different
providers, it is likely that a trust management framework will
have to be established for smart grid. This framework will
likely require the establishment of a set of criteria that are
to be met by vendors who wish to sell critical components
to smart grid operators. Additionally it is likely that one or
more accreditation organizations will need to be established to
audit suppliers to determine that they are meeting the specified
criteria [87].
VI. CONCLUSION
As a critical infrastructure, smart grid requires comprehen-
sive solutions for cyber security. A comprehensive communi-
cation architecture with security built in from the very begin-
ning is necessary. A smart grid communication security solu-
tion requires a holistic approach including traditional schemes
such as PKI technology, trusted computing elements, authen-
tication mechanisms based on industry standards. Clearly,
securing the smart grid communication infrastructure will
require the use of standards-based state-of-the-art security
protocols. To achieve the vision put forth, there are many steps
which need to be taken. Primary among them is the need for
a cohesive set of requirements and standards for smart grid
security. Industry and other participants should continue the
work that has begun under the direction of NIST to accomplish
these foundational steps quickly. However, the proper attention
must be paid to creating the requirements and standards, as
they will be utilized for many years, given the lifecycle of
utility components. In this paper, we present the background
and requirements for smart grid communication security. After
discussing the challenge of smart grid communication security,
the current research and solutions are surveyed. This paper
gives an insight to smart grid communication security in
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architecture features, system designs as well as technical
development.
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